Monday, May 23, 2005

5 21

Roloff 5 21

Jerks, Continued.

Sometimes, a situation prompts jer-like behavior.


1. Competition – Competitive people want victories, not ties or losses.

2 Types:

1) Absolute Competition: Wants a victory, regardless how slim the margin
2) Proportional Competition: This person is only happy if the margin of victory is large.

Given a choice of a 300 to 200 dollar margin, or a 10 to 1 dollar margin for victory, the proportionally competitive person takes the 10 to 1 margin, though they benefit more from the other deal.

Competitive people think that everyone is as competitive as they are.

When a competitive person negotiates with a cooperative person, the cooperative person becomes more competitive, which confirms the worldview of the competitive person.

People become more competitive when the results are made public. Roloff’s grad school experience – made first paper grades public, and in an icebreaker, made all students GREs and undergrad GPAs known to each other.

Competition can be instilled by structuring the situation, it isn’t a necessarily a personality trait.

2. Cooperation – interdependency, if I do well so do you, and if I do poorly so do you.

3. Individualism – people who are competitive are cognitively simple, individualists are cognitively complex. An individualist wants to do well and doesn’t care what happens to others. An individualist is not concerned with relative outcomes. The individualists will do what’s best for them, if they need to act competitively or cooperatively, they will. They are high Macs. Never assume an individualist is loyal, he or she will be loyal to him or herself.

Situations can make people individualistic. When there are scarce resources, people act in an individualistic way. During the last gas shortage, gasoline was topped off to be sure they had a full tank created artificial shortages, but people acted individualistically and topped off anyway.
Altruists – Want good things for others regardless what happens to them.

People act altruistically when they enter into a negotiation in which the outcomes mean more to the other party than to them. Gratitude will not be a factor for altruists; they won’t care whether they are thanked. People who want recognition and ego strokes for giving time or money are not really altruistic; people who give because the think it is the right thing to do are the first to quit, because the organizations are often run by ego-driven people.

Aggressive – A person who wants to hurt another, regardless what happens to them. This is also situational. When someone has been humiliated, they will act aggressively. These people will engage in negotiations that have lose-lose outcomes. These people will leave a job for another that pays less just to cripple the company they leave. A woman sued a company after working for a jerk who treated her poorly; they started by asking for a settlement. They go to a database of judgments and make an offer slightly above the average. They always say no, though the odds of success in court are small. The plaintiff’s attorney will be prompted by the plaintiff to ask questions the court won’t allow. The effort is made by the plaintiff to humiliate the boss but gets no money.

Face-related behavior – Brown – created a face-saving theory of negotiation. What makes us engage in fights is that someone humiliates us. All people want to believe that they are competent and strong, or at least no believe that they are incompetent or weak. When someone treats us like we are incompetent or weak, we are motivated to restore our face. The other party acts like a jerk, one can begin to act like a jerk. A low offer prompts efforts to show that the person to whom the offer was made is strong, usually they become difficult.

2 ways of looking at face:

1) Before negotiation – prior to a negotiation, you engage in behavior that shows that you are a force to be reckoned with, that you are tough. This can backfire. 2 months before a negotiations between CAT and Union, they ran ads asking for non-union labor that would cross the picket line. This galvanized the Union, and got them fired up. Sometimes, the expectancies of the constituencies are lowered on purpose, so that even a small victory is considered a big win. “Self-handicapping” = under-promise and over-deliver.
2) During the negotiation – A non-negotiable demand will set off face saving, as will threats, insults. The propensity to take things personally will lead some to lose face. Coercion is humiliating, it can lead to face-saving. “Always let them leave with their dignity” will prevent irrational face-saving measures.

3. Role – some roles put us in the position of acting like a jerk. Roloff was a jerk as chair of the program, stopped being a jerk when he was no longer chair.

Boundary Role Conflict – boundary roles mean that you have a lot of contact with people outside and inside the organization, e.g. salespeople or any people dealing with the public. People in boundary roles are stressed out, hate their jobs, and want to stop dealing with clients. Boundary Roles create torn loyalties; someone in that role has to deal with two groups of insane people.

Union Reps -------------------------------------------------------Management

Also accountable to:
- Rank and file -Stockholders

Reps come to like each other by the end of a negotiation, and start to complain about their constituents.

When constituencies were asked how to evaluate a rep, what was the #1 thing they wanted? It was obedience. The next was to be tough. The quality of the agreement was third.

How do constituencies control the rep?
1) Restrict his or her authority.
2) Increase accountability – force them to come back and explain why they did what they did.
3) They control outcomes (rewards and punishments)
4) Monitor negotiation
5) Provide feedback – it doesn’t matter what feedback is given, it makes the rep tougher; if you are doing a good job, you assume it is because of toughness, but if you are doing a bad job, you get tougher in response
6) Support – Study: When would elected representatives be most loyal to the wishes of constituencies, when they win by a large or small margin? Small margins are more loyal, large margins act independently.

What do reps do to get more independence from constituents?

1) Invite a small, select group of rank and file to watch the negotiation – these are usually those who would be supportive.
2) Provide constant information to constituency – bullet pointed memos
3) Try to negotiate in private, unwatched by constituency (some states have sunshine laws, which dictate that negotiation must be announced), like on a golf course or bar.

How can I use my constituency against my opponent?

1) “My hands are tied” – my constituency will never agree to this. Studies suggest that this only works if your offer is above their resistance point. Car dealers who have to talk to their managers are using this strategy.

2) Contrast – contrasting ones view with his or her constituency

1 – constituency is tough, opponent acts the way the constituency wants,
results in deadlock
2 – constituency is soft, negotiator is soft – no concession is given
3 – constituency is tough, negotiator is soft – negotiator should claim to be soft reasonable, and compare himself to his constituency, say he’ll be replaced by crazies like his constituency.
4 – constituency is soft, negotiator is tough –

Third Party Assistance

Arbitration – binding vs. non-binding

In binding arbitration, the parties are legally bound to follow the arbitrator’s settlement.

In non-binding, the arbitrators tell the parties what their likely outcome is and make a recommendation, but the parties can still go to court (the law in IL is that the parties must first go to non-binding arbitration, and if one party agrees and the other doesn’t, the party that doesn’t must pay the fees of the arbitrators).

Grievance and Interest Arbitration – Grievance arbitration is worked into collective bargaining, disputes between employees and management are settled by arbitrators.

In interest, there is no contract, and an arbitrator decides. This is typically used in public-sector negotiation, nurse, firefighters, law-enforcement, air traffic controllers, situations in which going on strike would not serve the public interest.

The theory was that if arbitration was forced, a settlement negotiated in good faith would be reached. The theory assumed the hastening effect would result, but a chilling effect was what resulted, they slowed down concession-making, and a narcotic effect, in which people became addicted to negotiation. Arbitration bias resulted. Usually, management and labor and the American Arbitration Association would each submit a list, and one from each list would serve. Because arbitrators publish their results, their bias can be predicted, so there is no need to fear arbitration (there are usually pro-labor or pro-management arbitrators, none are neutral_


1) Precedent
2) Weak-person bias – arbitrators side with the weaker of the two parties, regardless who is right, an underdog effect (average age of arbitrators is 60, they are aging but predictable so the same arbitrators are often chosen).
3) Split the difference – arbitrators like to create a split-the-difference compromise. Final offer arbitration means that the arbitrator has to choose between one of the two final offers, which prevents parties from starting with an unreasonably high offer. People think that 80% think like them, so the are less afraid of final offer arbitration than they should be. Unions manipulated it by logrolling, they figured out that there were things the company wouldn’t give, so they are extremely reasonable on some issues, but asked for what they knew they’d never get. Management would look unreasonable, and Unions would win the final offer arbitration. Final Offer arbitration yields bad agreements, and Unions undercut their systems. They figured out how to adjust; arbitrators looked at each agreement issue by issue and picked the best from each.

Arbitration was started during WWI, to settle disputes in the railroad industry, since strikes would be detrimental to the war effort. The threat of arbitration is a deterrent, an incentive to make a settlement.


Trying to get two parties to agree and suggesting solutions. Not binding.

Mediators must convince parties to comply with their decisions. Most arbitrators are trained to look passive and indifferent, but mediators must have social skills. Mediators tend to be like negotiators, they represent society’s interests or they represent people who are not present but are affected by the agreement (Divorce mediators argue on behalf of the children). Mediators must sometimes engage in tough negotiation, but in other cases be an integrative bargainer. Credibility comes from the fact that the mediator is gaining and losing nothing from the outcome. In last MLB strike, the mediator threatened to reveal the negotiation tactics each side used if they didn’t settle in 90 days, and they settled in 90 days.


Emerged out of mediation. Content and process mediation, content said what the agreement should look like, process pointed to a way to settle. Content mediators would tell parties what an agreement should be, but process mediators wouldn’t judge the solution as long as it was properly negotiated. Process mediators became facilitators. These people will tell parties how to talk. “If you reached this agreement together, it must be good.”


Filley – amounts to group decision making, enforce negotiation steps.

Separate the parties, and transfer messages – “Shuttle diplomacy” Kissinger did between Cairo and Tel Aviv. An intermediary. If one party doesn’t know what they are doing, the mediator can advise them without parties losing face. Downsides: it takes longer to reach an agreement, and parties have no idea what the other side is told, and research suggests that these agreements are short-lived.

Single Text Method (aka, The Delphi Method) – combination of content and process. Mythology of the single text method goes along with the Camp David accords. Carter did not allow the Egyptians and Isrealis to directly negotiat; he put parties at opposite sides of the camp, and came in with a sample accord. “Here’s the document, tell me what is wrong with it” He took their feedback, revised the documents, and went through a series of iterations in which the Israelis and Egyptians never met. When they were about to settle, Carter allowed them to speak to each other, and they reached a settlement. This keeps that parties focused on the agreement, not on each other, and there are parts of the agreement that both sides can claim as their own.

Often, Third Party Intervention doesn’t work unless the parties have felt a lot of pain, and often won’t involve a third party if they haven’t experienced an adequate level of pain.

The Journal of Counseling suggests that marital counseling helps, but 83% divorce rate results when the counseling ends, because a third party/neutral ground are no longer available.

Monday, May 16, 2005

5 13

Roloff 5 13

Roloff doesn’t like The Harvard Negotiation Project:

Fisher and Ury – Getting to Yes – Positional Negotiation vs. “Principled Negotiation” - is now referred to as Interest Negotiation. It is called positional because in a negotiation, each position is presented, then the battle begins; a position is an offer, a lot of discussion about the proposals occurs during the negotiation.

Two versions of positional bargaining:

Soft – Goal – to reach an agreement, (low expectations).
Role – friends
Resistance Points – low resistance point
Trust – High
Concessions – made to build a good relationship
Disclosure – disclose everything

Tough – Goal – Victory
Role - Adversaries
Resistance Points – high resistance point
Trust – Low
Concessions – demand concessions
Disclosure – disclose nothing

Principled Negotiation:

Goal – “Wise Agreement” – meets the interests of the two parties. An interest represents the need or value served by an agreement, it is the reason you pursue an agreement. When Roloff interviewed with Wisconsin, if Fisher and Ury were in the agreement, they would insist that Roloff define his purpose for asking for the “Family Income” number he established. Roloff would have said that the lifestyle, and the status that came with the family income number, were the interests served.

Role – Problem solvers.

Resistance Point – NONE. If you set a resistance point, if you focus on one issue, you will lose site of possible alternatives; walking out of an agreement keeps negotiators from finding a solution.

Trust – Irrelevant. One should still try to negotiate with un-trustworthy people in an integrative fashion. Fisher and Ury said of Operation Desert Storm, we can negotiate with Saddam Hussein in an integrative way without military action. “Threre are no bad people” just misunderstandings. In “The Fog of War” McNamara said that we were minutes from war, Kruschev sent two letters, one conciliatory, and a second that was hostile. McNamara suggested they answer the first, as if they didn’t get the second, they were able to empathize with Kruschev, who was faced with advisors who wanted conflict. To Roloff, trust must be extended a little until earned or not deserved, shouldn’t move to a position of mistrust right away.

Concessions – make only if they are in your interest. U of W negotiation, Wisconsin told Roloff that a cordial relationship with peers was in his interest, and a high salary would have diminished that because of a peer review of salaries, so it was not in Roloff’s interest to demand a high salary, and he made a concession on that.

Disclosure – disclose interests, F and U suggest that negotiators should start by talking about their interests. Danger is that you won’t get what you don’t ask for; if money is a priority, don’t pose it as a lifestyle, ask for money.

Fisher and Ury anticipated criticisms, one of which was that the other party might want to negotiate positionally, they wrote a chapter in Getting to Yes about what to do.

Don’t push back - Understand their interests
Invite Criticism – we present our proposals as though they were perfect, we should seek feedback on the proposal to better understand the interests of the other side.
Seek information – it’s more important to ask questions than to give information
BATNA – best alternative to negotiated agreement. Create an alternative for yourself, an alternative to reaching an agreement. You should use BATNAs for defensive purposes rather than as offensive, threatening purposes (If you don’t give me a raise, I will leave and go to University of X). Roloff at U of W, he had a BATNA (stay at NU) so he could share interests and take the risk of not reaching an agreement with Wisconsin.

The tactics in the first book didn’t work so well in real life, so they wrote a second book.

Fisher and Brown – Working Together, Building Working Relationships

They overlooked something in the first book, one should establish a good working relationship with the other party in the negotiation.

2 things that go wrong in working relationships:

We assume similarity with the other party - it gets ugly when we discover that the other party isn’t like us. The False Consensus effect – everybody believes that their behavior is typical. Tested with Undergrads, suck on a pacifier, we will videotape this, and show it publicly. Would the students be willing? 20% accepted. The 80% who said no were asked how many students did they think refused to do it? They said 80%. The 20% who accepted said they thought 80% would accept.

We assume other parties will reciprocate the nice things we do. The positive norm of reciprocity is a nice assumption, but doesn’t always hold. The negative norm reciprocity, an eye-for-an-eye (which often escalates to create a deterrent) then takes over.

Fisher and Brown say that you have to not reciprocate the negative actions of the other, do not follow the negative norm of reciprocity.

- If the other side does not talk to you, you should continue to talk to them.
- Even if the other party rejects you, you should accept them
- Even if the other party misunderstands you, you should try to understand them
- Even if the other party is being coercive, be nice to them
- Even if the other party is irrational, be rational

Take the high road, then a good relationship will result.

They were criticized, so they wrote a third (Ury only):

Getting Past No, Negotiating your way from Confrontation to Cooperation

How do deal with difficult people:

“Go to the balcony” – when the other party gets competitive, which means taking a timeout. During the timeout, one controls their emotion and thinks of alternatives.
Acknowledge their point/feelings – when confronted with negative emotion. This disarms the other parties, negative emotions; it is a “step to their side”. Venting, and finding ways to cope with emotions.
When the other party uses their power against you, being coerecive. “Bring them to their senses, not to their knees.”
When the other party is skeptical about your offers. “Build them a golden bridge”. Build an offer that unexpectedly meets their interests.
Change the Rules of the Game– when the other party engages in positional negotiation. Reframe the argument; give the other side a lesson in interest negotiation.

Accommodation – mirroring the non-verbal of the other party. Mimicking the other party’s non-verbal reactions can help create a connection.

The downside of the Harvard School is that it requires a lot of effort, which one can ask whether it is worth it to do.

There is not a lot of evidence that it works.

How to Deal with Jerks!

Machiavellians – Christie and Geis – wrote about Machiavellian personalities, now a euphemism for sociopaths. Characteristics:

Low commitment to morality – a-ethical, they don’t worry about ethics, unencumbered by conscience. The ends justify the means.
Low ideological commitment – will switch religions/political affiliations if it helps them, sometimes radical changes.
High in emotional control – “Don’t get mad, get even”. High Machiavellians don’t get excited or bummed when good or bad things happen, but often they can act well, to create an image.
Don’t suffer from gross psychopathology – the behavior is not psychopathic.

High Macs don’t always act Machiavellians; they are driven by tangible outcomes, like money. Study, negotiation without money, high macs tied with lows, but high macs outperformed the lows when an award was given for good performance. There could be as many as 3 types of high Macs. The one core trait of Machiavellians is cynicism, they believe that nobody is any good.

3 types, each adapts to cynicism in different ways:

Fatalism – since the world is no good, they suck-up to powerful people, become flatterers and sycophants, but their loyalty low. They have low self-esteem.
Highly Competitive – Want to be the biggest shark in the ocean, do unto others before they do unto you. These people have high self-esteem. They are deceitful, and they are flatterers.
Religious – they are likely to rise to the top of their religions, “the religiosity scale” shows behavior, and these people will do things shown on the religiosity scale without being believers. Charles “Chucky” Kolson, advisor to Nixon, was put in the federal penitentiary, had a sign on his desk that said “if you have them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow.” Now a minister, working for inmates rights (Machiavellians will not be Machiavellian overtly).

The most current thinking on Machiavellianism is that we all have a proclivity toward Machiavellinism, because it is a survival of the fittest mentality, it is evolutionary.

Kids who become Machiavellian are raised in homes where discipline is random and unpredictable.

Highly Dogmatic Personalities:

Rokeach – 4 traits of a highly dogmatic person:

Tend to reject alternative belief systems – study where high and low dogs interviewed job candidates, high dogs ask about values, and make the hiring decision earlier in the interview process, since they are more concerned that the interviewee believes like them than compentency, low dogs are the opposite.
They like authority figures – high dogs engage in authoritarian submissiveness, highly obedient. These are likely to kiss up and kick down.
Future orientation – High dogs look to the future, they are visionaries. They don’t have a balanced perspective of past, present and future, which makes them hard to persuade, since they only see the future.
They are uncreative – they cannot step outside the box. They don’t have a sense of humor. National Lampoon did a parody of Playboy, reversed bikini tan lines. Low dogs found it funny, high dogs found nothing odd about the picture and didn’t find it funny. They distorted what they saw to fit what their expectations.

High dogs don’t compromise, or consider compromise a defeat. They must have it downloaded from an authority figure, then mistrust the compromise. Finding commonality or using authority is the only way to negotiate with high dogs.


Self-absorbed – everything is about them. They dominate conversations.Grossly optimistic – can-do attitude. Study forced them to fail, they go into a black mood, but they bounce back very fast. Narcissists bounce back up without learning; they consider failure a temporary setback. They blame others for their failure.

Wednesday, May 11, 2005

5 7

Integrative Bargaining – Pruitt

1. General Characteristics of Integrative Agreements

Yield High Joint Benefits – both sides achieve or exceed their levels of aspiration – how do we treat a compromise? “A lazy person’s integrative agreement”. Integrative bargainers don’t believe in compromise. Pruitt believes that sometimes the best integrative solution is a compromise, but if there are multiple issues on the table, a compromise is a minimum of what can be achieved.
Non-obvious – Prominent or salient (obvious) solutions are rarely integrative solutions. One of the biggest impediments, the most obvious solution, is a compromise.

2. Specific types of integrative agreements

a. Cost cutting – Make an offer that reduces the cost to the opponent’s image, or reduces face costs. Two concerns when negotiation –1. Precedent setting - an agreement with you sets precedent for other agreements. Ways around this – a. negotiate in private – students who want to take Roloff’s class should visit him in his office rather than appear in class and rush him with an add slip. He offers deals that are good for 31 minutes, and if the person tells roommate he/she also tries to contact Roloff the same way, both will be refused. b. Negotiate up front that this deal does not create a precedent – Roloff suggests it doesn’t work – one year teaching contracts offered because a tenured prof left leaving not enough time to hire another prof on the tenure track, they think they are entitled to the job after the one year is up. “When a precedent becomes the norm, you are screwed.” 2. Fear of appearing weak – student caught Roloff on a bad day, two weeks into the term, the student was honest, and said that she needed a C-level class to graduate. Roloff confronted her with the fact that she just needed a class and didn’t care which one, so she asked whether she could start again. She came back and said that her degree would be diminished if she didn’t take his very special class (honesty was not the best policy). Students who ask for an extension on a midterm either make their circumstances seem so bad that he doesn’t lose face granting an extension, or they grovel, say how tough Roloff is reputed to be, and builds face for Roloff. Or, they say how sensitive and understanding he is, attribute their compliance to a pro-social motive. Make the other party believe the solution is their idea, Roloff story in which a student took Roloff’s examples and used them on his paper, Roloff gave him those examples because R wanted to help him quickly. Sanctioned Forums – a person makes a request, and a group decides whether to grant. Putting decision-making in the hands of a group makes individual face issues disappear.
b. Logrolling – Pruitt is best known for this. Multiple issues with different priorities are on the table; make concessions on low priority issues while standing firm on the high priority issues. A trade-off strategy. Source of the term is from politics, democracy works because of logrolling, divergent groups are willing to give concessions that are meaningless to them as long as they get a high priority item in return. In Springfield, they don’t care about what happens in Chicago, and vice versa. This is a controversial technique, esp. in politics this is considered unethical.
c. Non-specific Compensation – After a negotiation starts, you add a new reward to the mix, something else that adds value. In logrolling, all issues are on the table; in non-specific compensation, priorities are shared with opponent, so a new reward is added to enable trade-offs. A way to create trade-offs when none are otherwise available. Downsides: 1. Must create something of actual value to the other side. Money must be exchanged for a greater measure of a non-money item, like service. 2. It looks like a bribe, can cheapen the negotiation, sweeteners can look superficial or cheap, or appear unethical because they are not within the parameters of the deal, e.g. Cubs tickets to close a pharma deal.
d. Bridging – Non-conventional, anti-prominence, transform the situation by acting in ways that you haven’t before. Study done a U of Michigan, gave midterm then took 50 points away from every score, so all failed. He made the class negotiate against each other to get points back. 10 rounds of Creative alternative game – P and O. P can choose C or D, O can choose A and B. A and C, both get 4 points, C and B, P gets 4, O gets 0. A and D P gets –8, O gets 4, D and B, P gets 20, O gets –2. (ex) Prominent solution is that each gets 4. Solution is that D B and the 20 points are split, 11 to 9. Over 10 rounds points are more than made up for, 90 points exceeds that 50-point loss. When will people negotiate? Face to face worked, passing notes did not. Personality was a factor; people who are dogmatic would not negotiate, two high-dogmatic people would not negotiate, were not creative, a high/low the low found the solution and convinced them. Two lows will find it together. For Bridging to work, preconceptions of how the game is played must be abandoned. Dogmatic people will blindly follow precedent.
e. Unlinking Agreements – like nonspecific compensation in reverse – removing issues upon which parties can’t agree from the negotiation. 1. Fractionation – breaks a complex issue into parts and deal with the parts separately. Doesn’t work after negotiation has already begun. When filling a role in Comm, people wanted to add to that area but didn’t like the person proposed to fill it; since a link was already created, the position couldn’t be looked at in a vacuum without the person proposed. A strong negative component will defeat fractionation. Removing parties who care about the decision is a way to fractionate – risky shift research in Roloff’s undergrad, he was put into a group with a high-risk taker in hopes that a group would take risk individuals wouldn’t. Vote was 4-1 for 60% success of marriage before recommending marriage. Roloff made a motion that the risk taker couldn’t vote, and the decision was unanimous. Roloff proposed changing the meaning of unanimity. Research made them consider the other, they voted to recommend marriage when chances were 1 in 10.High-risk taker was only influential when he couldn’t be ignored. Roloff controlled the schedule when a difficult prof was on a committee, they met when the difficult prof was unavailable. 2. Precedent setting – the way it has been done makes unlinking possible 3. Agree to disagree – leave the issue unsettled, doesn’t work if the issue must be settled.
f. Reopener Agreements – risk and uncertainty, possible negative outcomes, one party holds out because of fear. Put a time limit on the arrangement, make a temporary arrangement. An MSC student was asked to sign a prenuptial agreement. She objected, he pushed her to get an attorney so the agreement would hold up in court. Her attorney told her not to sign it. Since the wedding was already arranged, they stopped talking about it. Day of the wedding, the attorney appeared and said she should sign or the wedding would be called off, the groom was elsewhere. Her attorney appeared, his attorney said that he’d been taken to the cleaners in a prior 2-month marriage, and didn’t want to repeat that. Her attorney said that a codicil, the prenup was only good for the first year of marriage, then they would renegotiate. They’d been married for 7 years at the time she wrote the paper (the couple didn’t renegotiate after a year). When MSC was started, the School of Speech had to grant faculty for the program. One of the artsy types suggested that the MSC was a military industrial complex sellout. One prof suggested a reopener with a 5-year time limit. After 5 years, the issue was never revisited. Pruitt says that the downside to the reopening agreement is that it could undercut the agreement, if there is a chance the agreement will be cancelled; the party may under invest to cut its losses. If marriages were renegotiable periodically, it would discourage people from kids, buying real estate, things that come with commitment. At first, the Constitution was to be renegotiated every 19 years, would have had bad results.
g. Contingency Contracts – Became popular in sports negotiations, late-career athletes’ contracts were given a base plus performance incentives.


1. Simultaneous consideration – consideration of issues – package offer
2. Search Model – “Reasonably High” goals - no prominent solution, challenges one to exert effort, low goals and unreasonably high goals discourage effort. A. Set reasonably high goals B. Find ways the opponent can help you meet your goals C. If opponent rejects offer, readjust the ways the opponent can help you meet your goals. Roloff was upset at NU, applied at Wisconsin, they wanted him and were willing to negotiate for as long as possible. R set a family income goal, set it reasonably high because raises once hired are hard to come by. Thought of all that U of W could give a prof 1. Salary 2. Summer Support (a summer school class or a grant) 3. Research Support (travel, journal and book money) 4. Tuition support for daughters. 5. Discretionary fund. 90% comes from salary. U of W said they couldn’t afford to pay that, because at U of W a committee of faculty vote on what everone else should make, so he’d never see a raise, and other faculty would know that his salary came from their potential raises. Pruitt says that Roloff should have reduced the amount that came from salary (90%) and shifted it to another category. Patents feed a slush fund, which is distributed to other faculty. U of W still couldn’t meet his needs. They came up with a possible deal-closer; they offered Roloff’s wife a job! They log rolled in reverse, and asked Roloff to adjust his salary because Karen would be working at U of W. Karen went to Madison, and favored a move. It almost worked, NU countered, Karen really didn’t want to move from Chicago. Don’t lower goals, just adjust paths, unless the other party proves that you can’t get what you want.
3. Strategies - Information exchange – two types 1. Goals 2. Priorities to get to goal. According to Pruitt, it is more important to negotiate priorities than goals, you can settle without knowing goals. Pressure strategies – the more argumentative or coercive you are, the less likely an integrative agreement will be reached. One exception, if you are argumentative about the workability or advantages of the offer. At U of W, they gave Roloff a practical disadvantage to paying him, the political fallout when salaries are reviewed by other faculty. They didn’t question Roloff’s value, they offered a better way to achieve the family income goal. Bargaining strategies – 3 types 1. Sequential approach – least effective. All items on the table, settle each item in sequence. Very inefficient way to do integrative bargaining, if a priority item is not settled, the negotiation can fail. Log rolling is much more effective. One-sided log rolling, you make concessions on your low priority items, the other party will do the same naturally, disadvantage is the time it takes.

Pruitt’s general principle –Flexible Rigidity – To be an effective integrative bargainer be rigid as to goals, but flexible as to the means to achieve them. The two most pressing considerations: 1. Being rigidly rigid – looks like tough bargaining 2. Flexibly flexible – too easy, soft, insufficiently stubborn.

The dual concern model, be highly concerned for other party but sufficiently demanding on ones own behalf. Anticipated future interaction will raise concern for the other party, but may give too much. If they were accountable to a constituency but also had a future with the other party, this created a balance.

Monday, April 25, 2005



I. Statement of Problem Area
A. Background of Negotiation
1. Individuals involved in negotiations
2. Parties they represent
3. Purpose of the negotiations
4. Goals
5. Issues
6. Setting
7. Short history of the negotiation

B. Nature of the Problem
1. General description of the failure or projected problems
2. Consequences of failure or problem

II. Statement of theory
A. Key concepts and definitions

B. Propositions and/or explanatory statements

III. Hypotheses
A. Statement of hypotheses about the cause of the failure

B. Description of hypotheses. Short paragraph that explains what each hypothesis means.

C. Justifications for hypotheses
1. Relationship to theories
2. Supporting research
3. Examples drawn from problem area

D. Evaluation of each hypothesis
1. Specify the conditions that must be present in order for the hypothesis to be valid
2. Specify alternative causes and indicate why they are not valid, appropriate, or optimal

IV. Proposed Intervention
A. Intervention suggestions
1. Change in procedures of the negotiation
2. How is the change related to hypotheses?
3. Indicators of success or failure for the intervention
4. Costs and risks of intervention
5. Backup solutions for costs and risks
6. Probability of success of intervention and why

V. Bibliography and/or footnotes

4 23

Roloff - 4 23

Distributive Bargaining – A zero-sum game, if I get what I want, I get it at your expense. More is better, for me.

Goals - Utility Schedule – More than just the dollar figure, a range of possible dollar figures (not an interest negotiation, only dollar range is considered, not what the dollars can buy). Status quo point - the value of what I currently have. Minimum necessary share or resistance point is the minimum amount over which I will have to benefit or I will not negotiate (could be at point at which losses are cut). The resistance point is usually not flexible; people set it and stick with it. Level of aspiration – goal toward which negotiation is oriented, a best estimate of what you will get. When the negotiation begins, level of aspiration can be modified. Initial Offer – amount it should exceed level of aspiration varies, e.g. not a standard 10%, but should start higher than l.o.a. NU cost study showed that the value of an NU education was better regarded when tuition costs were greater, though a middle-class student suffered when tuition rose. Experts in negotiation use utility schedules (a range) rather than a target, whereas non-professional negotiators use targets.

3 Strategies for Distributive Bargaining:

Bargaining (detail in 4 15 notes) – exchange of offers and counter offers.
1. Tough Bargaining – level of aspiration theory – beat down the opponent’s level of aspiration. How? A. Start with high opening offer. B. Make very few concessions, “make the other side work”, C. Make those concessions you do give small. D. Make a take it or leave it offer, or the Final Clear Chance offer E. Protect own level of aspiration. The other side is likely to mirror this strategy, and makes negotiation a game of chicken, a first-to-blink proposition. Requires a crazy look, strong resolve (When playing chicken, show up drunk, throw out the steering wheel and cut the brake line). If you reach an agreement as a tough negotiator, the tougher you are, the better the deal. Tough negotiation works best when one side owns a scarce resource the other side wants. Downsides of tough negotiation: It destroys the relationship with the other party, likely they won’t negotiate with you again. When you get a reputation as a tough bargainer, people become tougher with you, and increases the likelihood that no agreement will be reached.
Moderately Tough Bargaining – 1. Fair bargaining – price set at market value, and doesn’t move - a fair offer. Used by people who don’t like to negotiate. Data indicates that this method doesn’t work; people were more likely to accept an offer after negotiating than the same offer made first and not negotiated. Fair offer has an intuitive appeal, but people would rather play the negotiation game. 2. Reciprocity Approach – do what the other side does,. Downside: a. It requires negotiators to be aware of the progress of the negotiation 3. Reinforcement Approach – Reward opponent for making concessions. The primary reinforcer is a slightly larger concession; if your opponent makes a concession, you make a slightly larger concession. This method depends on being able to accurately predict where the negotiation is likely to end up, not a difficult thing to do according to Roloff. The only circumstances under which concessions are given are when the other side makes a concession; otherwise stand firm. 4. Commitment Approach – Brakes negotiation into two phases 1. Sham bargaining – “true concessions are made just before the deadline”, determines two things – resistance point (the least you are willing to take) and deadline of the other party. Right before the deadline, a take-it-or-leave-it offer is made, at a level just above the resistance point. 2. Offer. Dangers are misjudging the other party’s resistance point. De-commitment strategies, like the claim of new information or an initial offer with flexibility that gives the appearance of not standing firm, or claim that the other party is someone you like or appreciate, don’t work. Another danger is the other party making a commitment first; poking fun at the hard line attitude or pretending not to hear the commitment are ways to resist the other party’s commitment. (The first one to blink loses credibility).
Soft Bargaining – Pacifist Strategy – 1. Ideologically driven 2. Risk taking – stand to make an offer without reciprocity, take a chance by being vulnerable 3. Non-coercive. Studies suggest that pacifists are duped and taken advantage of because their beliefs drive their behavior, and makes them vulnerable. Why are soft bargainers exploited? The expectation is that the pacifism is an act, so the other party acts defensively (When Michiavellians negotiate with pacifists, they see a Trojan horse, then take advantage of them when they realize the pacifists are honest). All evidence suggests that soft bargaining should be avoided.

b. Argumentation Strategies – Donahue - Focused on rationales, reason-giving for a position. Naïve people pose arguments they find strong, experienced negotiators use arguments the other side will find strong. According to this strategy, the most argumentative party will win. Refuting the other side’s claims, and refuting what the other side says about your claims achieves relative advantage (Negotiation as debate strategy). Downsides to the argumentation strategy are that reciprocal argument can lead to deadlock, and Donahue ignores other factors, assumes that power is established during negotiation; power/authority trumps argumentative ability. Inexperienced negotiators engage in sequential planning (a script) while experienced negotiators come in with clustered planning (contingencies, no script). Inexperienced negotiators present too many arguments, professionals present only what they need to win. Dilution effect – a weak argument, even when presented with a strong one, will be attacked, at the expense of the strong one.

c. Power and Coercion - The use of power. Face/credibility issues are at stake – “don’t make a threat you won’t carry out.” A last resort. How to threaten well? Tedeschi – when someone is threatened, they will either ask themselves whether the threat will hurt (Most of the time, the imagined harm is worse than the actual harm). “Graveyards are full on indespensible people.”

Threat-credibility depends on two things: 1) The history of following-through on threats 2) Threat believability – could anyone carry out the threat, how possible is it to exercise the threat.

Face issues are at stake when threats are made, compliance means an admission of weakness, succumbing to threats is humiliating, and face-saving can lead to irrational behavior. Tedeschi says that threats must be used in ways that won’t create face issues. One way is to apologize for having to make the threat. Another is to recount what has been done up to the time the threat was made, that every other possible course was tried. Another is to tie the threat to a higher principle, elevate the principle to a non-negotiable rationale for the threat. Another is to say that threats are normative, it is done by others. Issuing a promise instead of a threat, rephrasing the threat as a promise, e.g. “people who show up on time get raises.” Another is to use a deterrent threat instead of a compellant threat; compellant requires behavior, deterrent prohibits behavior; people are angrier when they are forced to do something than when they are prohibited from doing something. People react less negatively to a contingent threat than a non-contingent threat; a contingent threat gives options, circumstances under which punishment can be avoided, non-contingent threat is just a promise of punishment. Using a warning instead of a threat is a way to avoid face issues, e.g. surgeon general’s cigarette warning. Implied threat is another way, making the threat imminent, but not direct (Interviewed prof from Penn who flew to Evanston from California, implied threat of accepting an offer from Stanford).

Tuesday, April 19, 2005

4 15

Roloff 4 15

What constitutes a fair exchange?

Fairness has two functions:

Establishes Criterion for negotiation
Creates arguments for further negotiation

Rules of Distributive Justice –

Equity – The person who puts in the most deserves the most – research suggests that equity is a fundamental rule that people use in daily life, merit increases et al are based on equity. We are socialized to think this way; we are willing to accept less compensation as long as we are sure that someone else has produced more, and therefore deserves more. Biases –
Egocentric Bias – We all believe that we contribute things of greater value than other people think we contribute. Sometimes a defensive position, esp. if we know we contributed less. Also, people remember and see their own contributions better than the contributions of others, a memory bias, and selective attention. Ownership effect, the same idea is better when generated by me than when it’s generated by you.
Comparisons – Historical comparisons – comparing self with self. What I did this year should yield a larger raise than last year if I worked harder this year. External factors account for disparities, e.g. smaller pool from which to draw raises in a given year. Interpersonal comparison – comparing self with someone like self - what raise did I get compared to what someone with same position and tenure as me got? Collective comparisons – Comparing self to group – What raise did I get compared to a group average? How does my group compare to other groups?

What to do if you aren’t treated equitably?

Reduce contribution
Demand compensation
Restore Psychological Equity – rationalize the inequity with intangibles, e.g. at Northwestern, an employee is part of the NU atmosphere, easy to manage work/life.

What about the person getting more than he or she deserves? They could compensate the victims (those paid less than they deserve), but most of the time they restore psychological equity by rationalizing the disparity (I deserve it, or I have been the victim in the past, so this benefit compensates for the past (transrelational equity). Study showed that if A was given more than B for the same work, B would cheat C and D until he is “even”.

The Allocator, the one who created the inequity, could say he or she was wrong and re-allocate, but usually justifies the decision, sometimes using made-up rationale, or a promise to make up for the inequity in the future (which may make a victim of someone else).

Status – the person with the highest status deserves the most. Seniority is an element of status. Equity theorists claim that status and equity rationale are the same, but this assumes that the people at the top of an organization are contributing commensurate with their status.

Need – the people who need the most get the most. Leads to rewarding the needy, rather than the hardest working or the longest tenured, and the budget rule of spent it or lose it.

Equality – Everyone gets an equal share of the pie. Used when under time pressure, when the pie is small, or if a one-time windfall is distributed. Equality is “the excess resource rule.” Advantages are that equality reduces open conflict, and it’s a status boost, creates feeling that all are contributing. Can lead to “pathological egalitarianism”, resistance to any sign of inequality.

Deutch – Conflict/Hidden Conflict

A. Types
Vertical Conflict – Win or lose
Cotangential - outcome depends on cooperation; one party can prevent a desirable outcome for the other by not cooperating.
Misattributed Conflict – the wrong people are fighting each other.
Displaced Conflict – Two parts: a) Manifest Level –what people are saying to each other b. Latent Level – what parties aren’t saying, a hidden agenda.
False Conflict – A misperception of events causes this conflict.

B. Issues
Resource Scarcity
Relationships – Power – money issues in marriages are often fights over control and power rather than a fight over scarce resources.
Values – ideal states, things we’d like to be true. Research suggests that value conflicts are the hardest to resolve. Research suggests that if another party disagrees with you on some values, the assumption is that they disagree on all values. Pro-life and pro-choice advocates agree score the same on choice and life values, but prioritize differently, and make that difference the most important one.
Beliefs – A statement of what is.
Preferences – Things like habits are preferences. The more a couple reports that spouses have annoying habits, the likelier the couple will divorce within a decade.

People will either resolve conflicts cooperatively or competitively. People are biased to assume that the person with whom they are in conflict are more different from themselves than they actually are.

Factors that contribute to competition/cooperation:

1. Equality breeds competition – the more people consider themselves equal to the other side, the likelier they will be to compete.
2. A claim of inherent superiority creates competition.3. Links – the way the parties are used to interacting will be applied to new situations.

Monday, April 11, 2005

4 9

Roloff – 4/9

Course divided into two parts:

Distributive Bargaining - Win/Loss scenarios, zero sum game, my gain is your loss. Strength comes from number of alternatives each side has.

Function – We negotiate the ends of disputes as well as terms.
Preparation – Planning and preparation (knowing what goals of negotiation are) is the most desirable quality of negotiator, not glibness.
1. Bargaining Strategies – Exchange of offers and counteroffers – bidding behavior – a. Tough negotiation, e.g. level of aspiration theory (beat down the other side’s goals, and they will lower their aspirations) b. Moderately tough negotiation, e.g. fair bargaining, commitment strategy (delay to get the other party into time pressure, then make a take-it-or-leave-it offer when it is too late for them not to commit) c. Soft negotiation – Converting hostile parties into friendlies. (Being a nice person doesn’t work! Nice people are exploited because other party doesn’t know if they trust the friendly act, they assume a defensive position).
2. Argumentation Strategies – Deal with rationales, e.g. Relative advantage - my claim that my product is good is countered with a claim that my product is poor.
3. Coercion Strategies – The use of power. Face/credibility issues are at stake – “don’t make a threat you won’t carry out.” A last resort.

There will be a paper and bargaining simulation after the distributive bargaining section.

Integrative Bargaining

a. Dean Pruitt – Logrolling approach – trade-off of things that are unimportant to me but important to you for the reverse from you (e.g. salary for comp time). Win/win is possible. Not all situations have logrolling potential; salary may be a high priority for both parties.
b. Harvard – Principled Negotiation – Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes. “Interest Negotiation” – interests are often assumed, or position (salary requirement) is confused with interest (standard of living the desired salary can afford). Interest negotiation takes resistance off the table, but if the other party refuses to bargain in an integrative way, Fisher and Ury can only suggest you turn the other cheek.
c. Roloff – Negotiation with Jerks - Roloff’s own work! ;-)
d. Third Party Negotiation – Arbitration - binding (can tell parties what to do) and non-binding (signals how a legal settlement would go, can keep cases off the docket) Facilitation – a third-party that helps the parties reach agreement, cannot suggest or evaluate settlements, Mediation – suggests and evaluates agreements.

Last Paper due on Integrative Bargaining.

Final lecture – Why marriage is screwed up (Can be hazardous to your health).

Distributive Negotiation

Sawyer and Guetzkow – Definition of negotiation

“A process by which 2 or more parties interact while trying to reach an agreement that will guide and regulate their future interaction.”

“Good Faith” negotiation (bad faith is defined by law) - when a party is trying to reach an agreement. If an offer were made and reneged upon, or foot dragging occurred before negotiation to apply time pressure, or if a party refused to meet at regular intervals, that party is showing signs of bad faith.

Metaphors: Negotiation is a…

Ritual – There are Roles, a Script (labor argues anecdotally, management argues with metrics), and Outcome is known (The artifice frustrates people).

Game – There are winners and losers, rules, strategy, and players who enjoy the game.

Tool – Used to achieve a goal (resource (tangible) and face-saving (intangible)), affected by the amount of effort applied, there are other alternative tools for the job.

Drawbacks of negotiation:

Inefficient – refusal to negotiate, coercion are more efficient
Opportunity Costs – e.g., negotiating is time consuming
Sets Precedent


Transfer – two parties make an exchange, each loses and gains
Sharing – cost: party could lose the capacity to make a profit, e.g. music, intellectual property like software
Generalized Exchange – Serial exchange, A gives to B who gives to C…but nothing is given back to A, or all give to A but A gives nothing to the others. No reciprocation, all one-way. E.G., Dad doesn’t expect to be repaid for kid’s college, but asks that he make the grandchildren’s lives better than his own. Kid is obliged to follow the path set forth by father, have kids and make money. “Pay it Forward” is a generalized exchange. Not common in the U.S., common outside of the U.S., may create cohesion in a society, embedded in a culture and can’t be negotiated.
Context – Peter Blau – Two types of contexts:
1. Social – Unspecified obligations, e.g. against the rules to tell a person what they owe you for a favor, an implicit understanding. There is an unspecified time for repayment. The norm of reciprocity has two rules – repayment can’t come too fast, but not too slowly either. A debt is related to power, so too fast repayment means that the one owing the favor does not want to endure being one-down, too slow repayment is deadbeat behavior (a way to make an enemy ineffectual is to overwhelm him or her with gifts, because while they are in debt to you they are obliged to speak well of you and act favorably toward you). Un-fixed Rate of Exchange, e.g. the value of one’s time, a “made gift” can be just as high as another’s’ time or purchased gifts. Non-repayment can result in stigmatization. Social obligations create feelings, e.g gratitude. Initiates a relationship. Social exchanges cannot be negotiated.
2. Economic – Specified obligations, specified time for repayment, fixed rate of exchange, one can be sued for non-payment. Impersonal, no feelings involved. No expectation of a relationship. Economic exchanges are totally negotiable.

c. Resources – Foa and Foy

x-axis – concrete-abstract
y-axis- universalistic-particularistic

Love = very particularistic, medium-abstract
Services = very concrete, less particularistic than love
Status = very particularistic, very abstract
Goods = very concrete, medium-particularistic
Information = medium particularistic, very abstract
Money = Very universal, medium-abstract

Foa and Foy recognize that their cognitive categories can be interpreted differently. A favor falls into one (or more than one) of those six categories.

particularistic . love

services . . status

goods . . information

universalistic money .

concrete abstract

For each resource there is an optimal range defined by a minimal amount at which you’ll want more of the resource, and a maximum amount at which you want to get rid of some of the resource (research indicates that there is no upper boundary for money).

d. Rewards – Value
- A shortage or perceived shortage can create demand.
- Satiation/deprivation – something becomes more valuable when we haven’t had it in a long time.
- Consensus – everyone agrees on value. Consensus sometimes conflicts with supply/demand, norms change to reflect supply/demand (e.g., the price of gasoline)
- Experts tell us what the value of something is, e.g. real estate appraisers. - Intrinsic properties of the resource, e.g. packaging of certain color or shape, and things associated with intrinsically valuable things take on their value, e.g. nostalgia of comic books, old vinyl records, et al.