Monday, April 25, 2005



I. Statement of Problem Area
A. Background of Negotiation
1. Individuals involved in negotiations
2. Parties they represent
3. Purpose of the negotiations
4. Goals
5. Issues
6. Setting
7. Short history of the negotiation

B. Nature of the Problem
1. General description of the failure or projected problems
2. Consequences of failure or problem

II. Statement of theory
A. Key concepts and definitions

B. Propositions and/or explanatory statements

III. Hypotheses
A. Statement of hypotheses about the cause of the failure

B. Description of hypotheses. Short paragraph that explains what each hypothesis means.

C. Justifications for hypotheses
1. Relationship to theories
2. Supporting research
3. Examples drawn from problem area

D. Evaluation of each hypothesis
1. Specify the conditions that must be present in order for the hypothesis to be valid
2. Specify alternative causes and indicate why they are not valid, appropriate, or optimal

IV. Proposed Intervention
A. Intervention suggestions
1. Change in procedures of the negotiation
2. How is the change related to hypotheses?
3. Indicators of success or failure for the intervention
4. Costs and risks of intervention
5. Backup solutions for costs and risks
6. Probability of success of intervention and why

V. Bibliography and/or footnotes

4 23

Roloff - 4 23

Distributive Bargaining – A zero-sum game, if I get what I want, I get it at your expense. More is better, for me.

Goals - Utility Schedule – More than just the dollar figure, a range of possible dollar figures (not an interest negotiation, only dollar range is considered, not what the dollars can buy). Status quo point - the value of what I currently have. Minimum necessary share or resistance point is the minimum amount over which I will have to benefit or I will not negotiate (could be at point at which losses are cut). The resistance point is usually not flexible; people set it and stick with it. Level of aspiration – goal toward which negotiation is oriented, a best estimate of what you will get. When the negotiation begins, level of aspiration can be modified. Initial Offer – amount it should exceed level of aspiration varies, e.g. not a standard 10%, but should start higher than l.o.a. NU cost study showed that the value of an NU education was better regarded when tuition costs were greater, though a middle-class student suffered when tuition rose. Experts in negotiation use utility schedules (a range) rather than a target, whereas non-professional negotiators use targets.

3 Strategies for Distributive Bargaining:

Bargaining (detail in 4 15 notes) – exchange of offers and counter offers.
1. Tough Bargaining – level of aspiration theory – beat down the opponent’s level of aspiration. How? A. Start with high opening offer. B. Make very few concessions, “make the other side work”, C. Make those concessions you do give small. D. Make a take it or leave it offer, or the Final Clear Chance offer E. Protect own level of aspiration. The other side is likely to mirror this strategy, and makes negotiation a game of chicken, a first-to-blink proposition. Requires a crazy look, strong resolve (When playing chicken, show up drunk, throw out the steering wheel and cut the brake line). If you reach an agreement as a tough negotiator, the tougher you are, the better the deal. Tough negotiation works best when one side owns a scarce resource the other side wants. Downsides of tough negotiation: It destroys the relationship with the other party, likely they won’t negotiate with you again. When you get a reputation as a tough bargainer, people become tougher with you, and increases the likelihood that no agreement will be reached.
Moderately Tough Bargaining – 1. Fair bargaining – price set at market value, and doesn’t move - a fair offer. Used by people who don’t like to negotiate. Data indicates that this method doesn’t work; people were more likely to accept an offer after negotiating than the same offer made first and not negotiated. Fair offer has an intuitive appeal, but people would rather play the negotiation game. 2. Reciprocity Approach – do what the other side does,. Downside: a. It requires negotiators to be aware of the progress of the negotiation 3. Reinforcement Approach – Reward opponent for making concessions. The primary reinforcer is a slightly larger concession; if your opponent makes a concession, you make a slightly larger concession. This method depends on being able to accurately predict where the negotiation is likely to end up, not a difficult thing to do according to Roloff. The only circumstances under which concessions are given are when the other side makes a concession; otherwise stand firm. 4. Commitment Approach – Brakes negotiation into two phases 1. Sham bargaining – “true concessions are made just before the deadline”, determines two things – resistance point (the least you are willing to take) and deadline of the other party. Right before the deadline, a take-it-or-leave-it offer is made, at a level just above the resistance point. 2. Offer. Dangers are misjudging the other party’s resistance point. De-commitment strategies, like the claim of new information or an initial offer with flexibility that gives the appearance of not standing firm, or claim that the other party is someone you like or appreciate, don’t work. Another danger is the other party making a commitment first; poking fun at the hard line attitude or pretending not to hear the commitment are ways to resist the other party’s commitment. (The first one to blink loses credibility).
Soft Bargaining – Pacifist Strategy – 1. Ideologically driven 2. Risk taking – stand to make an offer without reciprocity, take a chance by being vulnerable 3. Non-coercive. Studies suggest that pacifists are duped and taken advantage of because their beliefs drive their behavior, and makes them vulnerable. Why are soft bargainers exploited? The expectation is that the pacifism is an act, so the other party acts defensively (When Michiavellians negotiate with pacifists, they see a Trojan horse, then take advantage of them when they realize the pacifists are honest). All evidence suggests that soft bargaining should be avoided.

b. Argumentation Strategies – Donahue - Focused on rationales, reason-giving for a position. Naïve people pose arguments they find strong, experienced negotiators use arguments the other side will find strong. According to this strategy, the most argumentative party will win. Refuting the other side’s claims, and refuting what the other side says about your claims achieves relative advantage (Negotiation as debate strategy). Downsides to the argumentation strategy are that reciprocal argument can lead to deadlock, and Donahue ignores other factors, assumes that power is established during negotiation; power/authority trumps argumentative ability. Inexperienced negotiators engage in sequential planning (a script) while experienced negotiators come in with clustered planning (contingencies, no script). Inexperienced negotiators present too many arguments, professionals present only what they need to win. Dilution effect – a weak argument, even when presented with a strong one, will be attacked, at the expense of the strong one.

c. Power and Coercion - The use of power. Face/credibility issues are at stake – “don’t make a threat you won’t carry out.” A last resort. How to threaten well? Tedeschi – when someone is threatened, they will either ask themselves whether the threat will hurt (Most of the time, the imagined harm is worse than the actual harm). “Graveyards are full on indespensible people.”

Threat-credibility depends on two things: 1) The history of following-through on threats 2) Threat believability – could anyone carry out the threat, how possible is it to exercise the threat.

Face issues are at stake when threats are made, compliance means an admission of weakness, succumbing to threats is humiliating, and face-saving can lead to irrational behavior. Tedeschi says that threats must be used in ways that won’t create face issues. One way is to apologize for having to make the threat. Another is to recount what has been done up to the time the threat was made, that every other possible course was tried. Another is to tie the threat to a higher principle, elevate the principle to a non-negotiable rationale for the threat. Another is to say that threats are normative, it is done by others. Issuing a promise instead of a threat, rephrasing the threat as a promise, e.g. “people who show up on time get raises.” Another is to use a deterrent threat instead of a compellant threat; compellant requires behavior, deterrent prohibits behavior; people are angrier when they are forced to do something than when they are prohibited from doing something. People react less negatively to a contingent threat than a non-contingent threat; a contingent threat gives options, circumstances under which punishment can be avoided, non-contingent threat is just a promise of punishment. Using a warning instead of a threat is a way to avoid face issues, e.g. surgeon general’s cigarette warning. Implied threat is another way, making the threat imminent, but not direct (Interviewed prof from Penn who flew to Evanston from California, implied threat of accepting an offer from Stanford).

Tuesday, April 19, 2005

4 15

Roloff 4 15

What constitutes a fair exchange?

Fairness has two functions:

Establishes Criterion for negotiation
Creates arguments for further negotiation

Rules of Distributive Justice –

Equity – The person who puts in the most deserves the most – research suggests that equity is a fundamental rule that people use in daily life, merit increases et al are based on equity. We are socialized to think this way; we are willing to accept less compensation as long as we are sure that someone else has produced more, and therefore deserves more. Biases –
Egocentric Bias – We all believe that we contribute things of greater value than other people think we contribute. Sometimes a defensive position, esp. if we know we contributed less. Also, people remember and see their own contributions better than the contributions of others, a memory bias, and selective attention. Ownership effect, the same idea is better when generated by me than when it’s generated by you.
Comparisons – Historical comparisons – comparing self with self. What I did this year should yield a larger raise than last year if I worked harder this year. External factors account for disparities, e.g. smaller pool from which to draw raises in a given year. Interpersonal comparison – comparing self with someone like self - what raise did I get compared to what someone with same position and tenure as me got? Collective comparisons – Comparing self to group – What raise did I get compared to a group average? How does my group compare to other groups?

What to do if you aren’t treated equitably?

Reduce contribution
Demand compensation
Restore Psychological Equity – rationalize the inequity with intangibles, e.g. at Northwestern, an employee is part of the NU atmosphere, easy to manage work/life.

What about the person getting more than he or she deserves? They could compensate the victims (those paid less than they deserve), but most of the time they restore psychological equity by rationalizing the disparity (I deserve it, or I have been the victim in the past, so this benefit compensates for the past (transrelational equity). Study showed that if A was given more than B for the same work, B would cheat C and D until he is “even”.

The Allocator, the one who created the inequity, could say he or she was wrong and re-allocate, but usually justifies the decision, sometimes using made-up rationale, or a promise to make up for the inequity in the future (which may make a victim of someone else).

Status – the person with the highest status deserves the most. Seniority is an element of status. Equity theorists claim that status and equity rationale are the same, but this assumes that the people at the top of an organization are contributing commensurate with their status.

Need – the people who need the most get the most. Leads to rewarding the needy, rather than the hardest working or the longest tenured, and the budget rule of spent it or lose it.

Equality – Everyone gets an equal share of the pie. Used when under time pressure, when the pie is small, or if a one-time windfall is distributed. Equality is “the excess resource rule.” Advantages are that equality reduces open conflict, and it’s a status boost, creates feeling that all are contributing. Can lead to “pathological egalitarianism”, resistance to any sign of inequality.

Deutch – Conflict/Hidden Conflict

A. Types
Vertical Conflict – Win or lose
Cotangential - outcome depends on cooperation; one party can prevent a desirable outcome for the other by not cooperating.
Misattributed Conflict – the wrong people are fighting each other.
Displaced Conflict – Two parts: a) Manifest Level –what people are saying to each other b. Latent Level – what parties aren’t saying, a hidden agenda.
False Conflict – A misperception of events causes this conflict.

B. Issues
Resource Scarcity
Relationships – Power – money issues in marriages are often fights over control and power rather than a fight over scarce resources.
Values – ideal states, things we’d like to be true. Research suggests that value conflicts are the hardest to resolve. Research suggests that if another party disagrees with you on some values, the assumption is that they disagree on all values. Pro-life and pro-choice advocates agree score the same on choice and life values, but prioritize differently, and make that difference the most important one.
Beliefs – A statement of what is.
Preferences – Things like habits are preferences. The more a couple reports that spouses have annoying habits, the likelier the couple will divorce within a decade.

People will either resolve conflicts cooperatively or competitively. People are biased to assume that the person with whom they are in conflict are more different from themselves than they actually are.

Factors that contribute to competition/cooperation:

1. Equality breeds competition – the more people consider themselves equal to the other side, the likelier they will be to compete.
2. A claim of inherent superiority creates competition.3. Links – the way the parties are used to interacting will be applied to new situations.

Monday, April 11, 2005

4 9

Roloff – 4/9

Course divided into two parts:

Distributive Bargaining - Win/Loss scenarios, zero sum game, my gain is your loss. Strength comes from number of alternatives each side has.

Function – We negotiate the ends of disputes as well as terms.
Preparation – Planning and preparation (knowing what goals of negotiation are) is the most desirable quality of negotiator, not glibness.
1. Bargaining Strategies – Exchange of offers and counteroffers – bidding behavior – a. Tough negotiation, e.g. level of aspiration theory (beat down the other side’s goals, and they will lower their aspirations) b. Moderately tough negotiation, e.g. fair bargaining, commitment strategy (delay to get the other party into time pressure, then make a take-it-or-leave-it offer when it is too late for them not to commit) c. Soft negotiation – Converting hostile parties into friendlies. (Being a nice person doesn’t work! Nice people are exploited because other party doesn’t know if they trust the friendly act, they assume a defensive position).
2. Argumentation Strategies – Deal with rationales, e.g. Relative advantage - my claim that my product is good is countered with a claim that my product is poor.
3. Coercion Strategies – The use of power. Face/credibility issues are at stake – “don’t make a threat you won’t carry out.” A last resort.

There will be a paper and bargaining simulation after the distributive bargaining section.

Integrative Bargaining

a. Dean Pruitt – Logrolling approach – trade-off of things that are unimportant to me but important to you for the reverse from you (e.g. salary for comp time). Win/win is possible. Not all situations have logrolling potential; salary may be a high priority for both parties.
b. Harvard – Principled Negotiation – Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes. “Interest Negotiation” – interests are often assumed, or position (salary requirement) is confused with interest (standard of living the desired salary can afford). Interest negotiation takes resistance off the table, but if the other party refuses to bargain in an integrative way, Fisher and Ury can only suggest you turn the other cheek.
c. Roloff – Negotiation with Jerks - Roloff’s own work! ;-)
d. Third Party Negotiation – Arbitration - binding (can tell parties what to do) and non-binding (signals how a legal settlement would go, can keep cases off the docket) Facilitation – a third-party that helps the parties reach agreement, cannot suggest or evaluate settlements, Mediation – suggests and evaluates agreements.

Last Paper due on Integrative Bargaining.

Final lecture – Why marriage is screwed up (Can be hazardous to your health).

Distributive Negotiation

Sawyer and Guetzkow – Definition of negotiation

“A process by which 2 or more parties interact while trying to reach an agreement that will guide and regulate their future interaction.”

“Good Faith” negotiation (bad faith is defined by law) - when a party is trying to reach an agreement. If an offer were made and reneged upon, or foot dragging occurred before negotiation to apply time pressure, or if a party refused to meet at regular intervals, that party is showing signs of bad faith.

Metaphors: Negotiation is a…

Ritual – There are Roles, a Script (labor argues anecdotally, management argues with metrics), and Outcome is known (The artifice frustrates people).

Game – There are winners and losers, rules, strategy, and players who enjoy the game.

Tool – Used to achieve a goal (resource (tangible) and face-saving (intangible)), affected by the amount of effort applied, there are other alternative tools for the job.

Drawbacks of negotiation:

Inefficient – refusal to negotiate, coercion are more efficient
Opportunity Costs – e.g., negotiating is time consuming
Sets Precedent


Transfer – two parties make an exchange, each loses and gains
Sharing – cost: party could lose the capacity to make a profit, e.g. music, intellectual property like software
Generalized Exchange – Serial exchange, A gives to B who gives to C…but nothing is given back to A, or all give to A but A gives nothing to the others. No reciprocation, all one-way. E.G., Dad doesn’t expect to be repaid for kid’s college, but asks that he make the grandchildren’s lives better than his own. Kid is obliged to follow the path set forth by father, have kids and make money. “Pay it Forward” is a generalized exchange. Not common in the U.S., common outside of the U.S., may create cohesion in a society, embedded in a culture and can’t be negotiated.
Context – Peter Blau – Two types of contexts:
1. Social – Unspecified obligations, e.g. against the rules to tell a person what they owe you for a favor, an implicit understanding. There is an unspecified time for repayment. The norm of reciprocity has two rules – repayment can’t come too fast, but not too slowly either. A debt is related to power, so too fast repayment means that the one owing the favor does not want to endure being one-down, too slow repayment is deadbeat behavior (a way to make an enemy ineffectual is to overwhelm him or her with gifts, because while they are in debt to you they are obliged to speak well of you and act favorably toward you). Un-fixed Rate of Exchange, e.g. the value of one’s time, a “made gift” can be just as high as another’s’ time or purchased gifts. Non-repayment can result in stigmatization. Social obligations create feelings, e.g gratitude. Initiates a relationship. Social exchanges cannot be negotiated.
2. Economic – Specified obligations, specified time for repayment, fixed rate of exchange, one can be sued for non-payment. Impersonal, no feelings involved. No expectation of a relationship. Economic exchanges are totally negotiable.

c. Resources – Foa and Foy

x-axis – concrete-abstract
y-axis- universalistic-particularistic

Love = very particularistic, medium-abstract
Services = very concrete, less particularistic than love
Status = very particularistic, very abstract
Goods = very concrete, medium-particularistic
Information = medium particularistic, very abstract
Money = Very universal, medium-abstract

Foa and Foy recognize that their cognitive categories can be interpreted differently. A favor falls into one (or more than one) of those six categories.

particularistic . love

services . . status

goods . . information

universalistic money .

concrete abstract

For each resource there is an optimal range defined by a minimal amount at which you’ll want more of the resource, and a maximum amount at which you want to get rid of some of the resource (research indicates that there is no upper boundary for money).

d. Rewards – Value
- A shortage or perceived shortage can create demand.
- Satiation/deprivation – something becomes more valuable when we haven’t had it in a long time.
- Consensus – everyone agrees on value. Consensus sometimes conflicts with supply/demand, norms change to reflect supply/demand (e.g., the price of gasoline)
- Experts tell us what the value of something is, e.g. real estate appraisers. - Intrinsic properties of the resource, e.g. packaging of certain color or shape, and things associated with intrinsically valuable things take on their value, e.g. nostalgia of comic books, old vinyl records, et al.